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Literature—Technology—Media:  
Towards a New Technography 
 
This essay gives a brief account of some recent theoretical accounts of the technological mediation of 
culture — in particular the distinct but overlapping discourses of “media archaeology” and “cultural 
techniques” — and considers the implications of this recent technological or medial turn for literary 
studies. Media archaeology and cultural techniques have risen to institutional prominence in the last 
decade as energetic and influential disciplinary frameworks for the study of archives, protocols, 
devices, mechanisms, networks, infrastructures, and other technical systems. Yet literature has 
generally remained tangential to these inquiries, which have at times sought to define their 
investigations of technological culture explicitly in opposition to “textuality”, “discursivity”, or 
“literary studies”.  
 
My purpose here is to offer a measure of resistance to this binary distinction, which appears to stem 
from a view of literary scholarship as a discipline tainted by Enlightenment anthropocentrism. Much 
of the new media scholarship, following the logic of what Richard Grusin (2015) has called the 
“nonhuman turn”, has nurtured a certain skepticism about literature on the basis that it forms one of 
the pillars of the traditional humanities, the study of which has tended to privilege mind over body, 
spirit over matter, message over medium, human knowledge over non-human (or post-human) 
agency. Literary studies, according to this view, is based in and reinforces Enlightenment’s centring 
of the human subject, and its primary methodology of hermeneutic analysis remains indifferent to the 
crucial role played by technological mediation in the emergence and development not only of 
individual cultural forms, but of the ontological category of “the human”.  
 
To the contrary, I argue that the apparent antagonism between textuality and technology — a term 
that originates in the rhetorical theory of the ancient world — is itself a legacy of the Enlightenment 
and the first Industrial Revolution, when the classical principle of techne was replaced by a modern 
division between forms of theoretical and practical knowledge. Only by dealing with textuality and 
technicality as parts of the same dialectical process, I argue, can we move beyond that disciplinary 
and institutional antagonism to recognise their development as part of a single technographic history.  
 
 
Machine Agency: From Marinetti to Cultural Techniques 
 
If the cultural agency of technology has become a pressing concern for contemporary critical theory, 
the idea that technology might possess such agency is by no means new. Indeed, it has been a live 
topic in literary culture at least since the beginning of the twentieth century, when Filippo Tommaso 
Marinetti urged his followers to turn their attention away from the psychological qualities of man to 
magnify the technical object. Humanism, psychology, spirit, subjectivity: none of this, Marinetti 
insisted, was of any further use to the Futurist writer. Instead, what mattered was matter. “The solidity 
of a strip of steel interests us for itself; that is, the incomprehensible and nonhuman alliance of its 
molecules or its electrons that oppose, for instance, the penetration of a howitzer.” Of even greater 
interest were those mechanical assemblages or co-ordinations of matter which seemed to demonstrate 
agency in more dynamic ways. “We want to make literature out of the life of a motor,” he wrote, “a 
new instinctive animal whose general instincts we will know when we have learned the instincts of 
the different forces that make it up” (Marinetti, 1912, p. 87). 
 
Despite Marinetti’s barnstorming 1912 tour of London, the anglophone world did not prove 
particularly receptive to his machine-age gospel. On the whole, audiences were genially amused 
rather than shaken to their bourgeois foundations. Nonetheless, the “Technical Manifesto of Futurist 
Literature” suggests that the “post-human” turn of contemporary media theory may represent less a 
clean break with the naïve anthropocentrism of the traditional humanities than the recurrence of a 
profound and widespread dissatisfaction about the failure of cultural forms to adapt to changing views 
of the relations between humans and technological objects. Emerging from the chrysalis of 
modernism and postmodernism, cultural criticism finds itself calling for yet another repudiation of the 
human.  
 
After the Second World War, howitzers and steel plate seemed even less appealing than they had to 
Marinetti’s audiences in 1912. The precariousness of human agency had everywhere been 
demonstrated in its subordination to the demands of belligerent states, while the idea of machine 
agency tended to figure as profoundly disturbing. Fresh memories of technological genocide, 
mechanized warfare, and nuclear weapons nurtured visions of a future filled with killer robots and 
atomic automata. According to the philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1958), such fears implied a 
widespread misattribution of agency to technological objects, a misattribution that might have had 
something to do with the diminution of personal agency which many citizens had experienced during 
wartime. “No cultivated man,” Simondon wrote, “would allow himself to speak of things or persons 
painted on a canvas as veritable realities with an interior life and a will, good or bad. Despite this, the 
cultivated man does allow himself to speak of machines which threaten mankind, as if he were 
attributing to these objects a soul and a separate and autonomous existence which grants them the 
possession of feelings and of intentions towards mankind” (p. 3). For Simondon, machines were not 
to be thought of as something fundamentally other than human beings, but as physical manifestations 
of human relations and objectives. Fears of machine agency thus expressed a widespread cultural 
failure to understand that “in technical reality there is a human reality” (p. 1). 
 
Recent theories of technological media have usually begun not from Simondon’s account of the 
human reality in machines, but from the work of Friedrich Kittler, whose Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter (1999) set a new bearing with its bold opening announcement that “media determine our 
situation” (p. xxxix). One way of understanding this statement is as the reverse of Simondon’s 
position: Kittler insists not that technical reality is fundamentally part of human reality, but that 
human reality was always already technical, or (to put it another way) that our notions of what 
belongs properly to human reality derive from historically contingent arrangements of technological 
reality. Kittler’s influence since the mid-1980s is difficult to overstate, particularly in English-
speaking countries where his work has come to serve both as a catalyst for new inquiries into the 
mutual constitution of technology and culture and (less straightforwardly) as the paradigmatic 
instance of so-called “German Media Theory”. If that characterization certainly misrepresents the 
range and diversity of technology and media scholarship in German-speaking countries, it is equally 
certain that the “Kittler-effect” has been crucial in driving the recent boom in technological 
scholarship across the humanities. 
 
Yet Kittler himself remained somewhat circumspect on the subject of machine agency. If media 
determine our situation, they do so in part because, in the age of optical and acoustic storage media, 
the “essence” of humanity can no longer be understood as residing in embodied, self-sufficient 
subjects: instead it “escapes into apparatuses” (p. 16). The ghost in Kittler’s machine turns out to be a 
spectral form of humanity, albeit a humanity that had hitherto failed to recognise the historical and 
technological contingency of its own ontological status. Most scholarly extensions of Kittler’s work 
have likewise been too sophisticated to make claims for ghostly presences in technology. But, like 
Kittler, they have generally sought explanations of cultural forms in technological structures. 
 
The field of “media archaeology”, in particular, has come to designate a set of practices and forms of 
scholarship built around a central concern with machine agency. In its most stringent formulations, 
such as that offered by Wolfgang Ernst (2013), media archaeology insists, moreso even than Kittler, 
on the priority of mechanism: “Media archaeology concentrates on the nondiscursive elements in 
dealing with the past: not on speakers but rather on the agency of the machine” (p. 45). Its key works 
— including Siegfried Zielinski’s Deep Time of the Media (2008), Erkki Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka’s 
collection Media Archaeology (2011), Parikka’s various archaeological accounts of computer viruses, 
insect swarms, and geological materials, and the essays of Ernst — offer several quite different 
accounts of this archaeological approach. Within this body of work, however, two parallel (and 
perhaps contradictory) concerns are clear: a materialist emphasis on the the physical structures of 
technological devices and systems, and a Foucauldian rejection of teleology and continuity in favour 
of a cartographic tracing of variants, dead-ends, obsolete forms, and other marginal traces of the 
mediated life.  
 
Media archaeology has not been entirely dismissive of “discursivity” (Parikka, for instance, has 
insisted that media archaeology “rummages textual, visual, and auditory archives as well as 
collections of artifacts, emphasizing both the discursive and the material manifestations of culture” 
(2011, p. 3)) — but it has not, so far, taken much interest in the specific discursive form of literature. 
Indeed, on those few occasions when media archaeology has dealt with literary subjects, it has 
struggled to overcome what amounts to a form of hardware-bias, defining literature not as a sequence 
of dynamic processes, but as an object of knowledge. In 2015, the online journal Jacket 2 sought 
responses to the question: “How can media archaeology inform literary studies?” (n.p.). The 
responses gathered from self-identifying media archaeologists constituted a valuable account of the 
possibilities of media archaeology, but often seemed to do so at the expense of misrepresenting 
literary studies as a discipline. There was, for instance, a strong emphasis on poetry as the exemplary 
instance of literature, with no discussion of prose texts or of performance contexts. One respondent 
noted that “media archaeology’s most significant contribution to literary studies is the way it frees us 
from constantly, and only, interpreting content”, as if hermeneutic analysis remained the sole or even 
the main interest of literary studies. Finally, Parikka and Jane Birkin’s co-authored response argued 
that media archaeology should point the course away from literature to “an informational theory of 
literature as media: less hermeneutics, more Shannon and Weaver + information theory. […] As we 
know by now, text is not for reading. It is for processing. Ask any machine reading system and it will 
tell you the same.”  
 
From the standpoint of literary studies, it might reasonably be objected that readers are not simply in 
the business of “processing” texts in the way a machine-reading system processes them, discovering 
certain sequences or patterns independently of others. Rather, readers process texts in the sense that in 
reading they involve themselves in sequences and patterns designed to produce particular cognitive, 
physical, and affective responses. (And since reading may also involve various kinds of misprision 
and contingency, design may only be part of the event of reading.) Readers, even scholarly ones, read 
in pursuit of more than just signals or data: as they process a novel or a poem, they are in turn 
processed by it. The more accurate analogy is perhaps not with the machine-reading of a literary text, 
with the aim of extracting data, but with the machine-reading of a program, which alters the 
configuration of the machine itself. The idea of the poem as the paradigmatic literary object; the idea 
that literary studies has mainly been concerned with the interpretation of content; the notion that 
literary works amount to data for processing or signals to be encoded and decoded; the treatment of 
literary works as valuable primarily as signposts pointing towards some other theoretical destination 
― none of these positions has been able to lay much claim to orthodoxy in literary studies since at 
least the early 1980s. And there is, perhaps, an irony here: for while media archaeology traces its roots 
to Kittler’s inquiries into dynamically varying matrices of technological and textual agency, it has 
itself seemed content to positivise media and literature alike as objects or archives. 
 
An alternative to the hardware-oriented investigations of media archaeology has begun to emerge in 
the form of “cultural techniques”, which also has roots in German media theory. Cultural techniques 
is less well established in anglophone circles than media archaeology, but all signs point to its 
continued growth as a vigorous field. The two are not mutually exclusive; indeed, many scholars are 
active in both areas, which may be regarded as complementary or even continuous. The key 
publications so far include a special issue of Theory, Culture and Society edited by Geoffrey 
Winthrop-Young, Ilinca Iurascu, and Jussi Parikka in November 2013, and, more recently, Bernhard 
Siegert’s Cultural Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations of the Real (2015), 
translated by Winthrop-Young.  
 
The theory of cultural techniques has concentrated less on hardware than on the processes through 
which a broadly-defined field of “culture” emerges from intricate operations conducted by humans 
and non-human entities together. Here, too, though, that emphasis falls on a reallocation of agency: 
“Clearly, from the vantage point of cultural techniques, the sovereign subject becomes disempowered, 
and it is things that are invested with agency instead.” (Vismann, 2013, p. 86). Or, if not instead, then 
as well: Siegert (2015) draws on the sociology of Bruno Latour to describe a cultural technique as an 
“actor-network” including “technical objects and chains of operations […] in equal measure” (p. 193). 
Cultural techniques can be understood as the myriad undirected, independent processes through which 
seemingly foundational aspects of human culture come into being. The study of cultural techniques 
emphasises the emergence of “culture” from specific practices before those practices have solidified 
into concepts which will later be misidentified as causes rather than effects: on inscription before it 
gives rise to a notion of language; on counting before it gives rise to a notion of number; on the 
marking of thresholds before those thresholds give rise to notions of interiority and exteriority. From 
this perspective, agency “is not a given but is constituted by and dependent on cultural techniques”. In 
the theory of cultural techniques, emphasis falls on the production not of the human (as in Kittler) or 
of media (as in media archaeology), but of culture as an emergent property of interactions between 
entities. 
 
Siegert, in an invaluable historical account, traces the emergence of the theory of cultural techniques 
to German media theory’s rejection of the poststructuralist turn of the 1980s. The “anti-hermeneutic” 
preoccupations of Kittler-era media analysis, he notes, had prepared the ground for a “post-
hermeneutic” study of the technological mediation of culture. Siegert (2013) has sharp words, in 
particular, for “the many literature scholars, philosophers, anthropologists and communication 
experts, who were suddenly forced to realize how much there was beyond the hermeneutic reading of 
texts when it came to understanding the medial conditions of literature and truth or the formation of 
humans and their souls” (p. 51). Yet it is clear from his earlier work, and in particular his Relays: 
Literature as an Epoch of the Postal System, that “literature” for him means, above all, the public and 
professional field of humane letters that emerged after the middle of the eighteenth century, pre-
eminently in the work of his “master signifier”, Goethe. Literature constitutes “an epoch of the postal 
system” for Siegert (1999) because the systematization of postal networks in eighteenth-century 
Europe helped to reconfigure the boundaries of the private individual and the public sphere, laying the 
foundations for “literature” as the transmission of an author’s private subjectivity to and through a 
network of readers.  
 
While Siegert’s account of Germany’s eighteenth-century communications system undoubtedly 
illuminates the role of one historically-specific apparatus in the emergence of concepts of authorship 
and textuality, as a theory of relations between literature and technological mediation it might be 
thought to beg the question. In other words, the cultural techniques of the postal system give birth to 
“literature” because “literature” is the name Siegert chooses to apply to the kinds of writing which 
have been engendered by the cultural technique of the postal system. From the perspective of an 
anglophone scholarship which has traditionally taken a rather broader view of “literature”, this 
epochal circumscription will not do, for it stops short of acknowledging the operation of a broader 
historical dialectic between the concept of technology and the concept of literature which does not 
begin or end in Goethe’s mailbox. I stress the importance of the anglophone context here not out of 
any inclination towards exceptionalism, but rather because it was in England, during the Industrial 
Revolution, that the crucial conceptual separation between textuality and technology took place. It is 
to an account of this transition that I now turn.  
 
  
The Technographic Dialectic 
 
In their introduction to The Social Construction of Technological Systems, Wiebe Bijker, Thomas 
Hughes and Trevor Pinch (1987) distinguish between three meanings of the word “technology”: 
 First, there is the level of physical objects or artifacts, for example, bicycles, lamps, and Bakelite. 
Second, “technology” may refer to activities or processes, such as steel making or molding. Third, 
“technology” can refer to what people know as well as what they do; an example is the “know-how” 
that goes into designing a bicycle or operating an ultrasound device in the obstetrics clinic. (p. 4) 
 
Writing itself may be regarded as a technology, though one which now seems so fundamental to the 
history of our species that we have lost the tendency to think of it as such. It can indeed describe an 
artifact (“the writing of George Eliot”), the process that produces such an artifact (“I am writing a 
novel”), or the “know-how” activated in that process, which the ancient philosophers would have 
called its techne (“I teach writing to undergraduates”). 
 
Yet like most accounts of technology, the one given by Bijker, Hughes and Pinch leaves out the more 
complicated history of concepts sedimented in that set of definitions. In fact, when we speak about a 
“technology”, we are reaching for a term that originally referred not to a device, or to a physical 
process, or even to a form of “know-how”, but to a kind of text. To be more exact, we are reaching for 
a term that referred to a text considered as a kind of device, a device for thinking with, displaying, and 
understanding a particular verbal techne.  
 
For the Greeks, tekhnologia meant not a domain of objects but a genre of discourse; not a mechanism 
or a physical implement, but a tool nonetheless: a technical description of a subject made in 
accordance with agreed principles. When, at the very beginning of his first-century CE treatise On the 
Sublime, Longinus (1907) insists that every “systematic treatise” requires both a “statement of the 
subject” and “an indication of the methods by which we may attain our end”, his word for “systematic 
treatise” is τεχνολογίας (p. 41). And when, later the same century, Plutarch (1939) cautions that 
people talk too much about the subjects in which they feel themselves to be most expert, he notes that 
“the great reader” will prefer to spend all of his time “narrating tales”, while “the literary expert” will 
bore his listeners with τεχνολογίαις: “technical discussions” (p. 461).  
 
The earliest appearances of the term “technology” in seventeenth-century English likewise designated 
specialized uses of language. In particular, “technology” was used to denote sophisticated or abstruse 
jargon, as distinct from the pious plainness required in speaking of God. The scholar Isaac Casaubon 
(1612), for instance, cites the authority of the fourth-century Archbishop Gregory of Nazianzus, who 
denounced his contemporaries for their readiness to “dispute of spirituall things, and conuert 
Theologie into technology”, making the study of divinity “a matter of learned, or artificiall discourse” 
(p. 7). Similarly, in the dedication to a sermon first preached in 1645, the Norfolk priest Edward 
Willan takes pains to deny any hint of the rhetorical cleverness: “Indeed I ever intended θεολογειν in 
composing of this Sermon for the Pulpit, but τεχνολογειν, I never studyed, never intended, and 
therefore cannot but admire, that any in that Auditory should admire it for Technologie (p. 28). Even 
Sir Thomas Browne, in Hydriotaphia, or Urne-Buriall (1658), has occasion to refer to the 
“Cabalisticall Technology” of Jewish mystical tradition (p. 192).  
 
As Clifford Siskin (2016) has suggested, the spread of the term “technology” in early modern English 
tracks wider social and intellectual transformations over a period when informal, conversational forms 
of knowledge were gradually being subordinated to the kind of systematic rationality associated with 
print. Technology, Siskin points out, “is the ‘speaking of’ (-ology) a ‘techne,’ that is, an ‘art,’ or 
‘method’ or ‘system.’ […] Technology, as the speaking of something that speaks to itself, thus 
became an embodiment of a silent and self-sufficient reason” (p. 38). From the end of the 17th century 
onward, as specialized languages proliferated alongside new mechanical processes, the word 
“technology” began to be used to refer not to a systematic description of a field of knowledge or to 
the specialist jargon associated with a particular subject, but to the practical operations performed by 
physical systems. Since the most striking and innovative examples of such systems at that time were 
mechanical, “technology” soon came to be associated with the category of equipment used to perform 
such practical operations. In short order, a term for a discourse or a way of thinking and speaking was 
transformed into a term for a set of material structures and implements.  
 
Technological innovation – particularly the new dominance of print – had helped to disseminate the 
new sense of “technology” as a matter of mechanical systems and operations rather than of verbal 
ones, so that by the middle of the eighteenth century this meaning was dominant. At around the same 
time, as John Guillory (2010) has noted, the arrangement of knowledge into mechanical and liberal 
arts which shared a basis in “the concept of techné” was superseded by a new arrangement of 
knowledge in which the “fine arts” were taught and studied as elements of aesthetic theory, which 
“excluded all mechanical arts as well as former liberal arts such as logic and rhetoric” (p. 346n). Thus  
the modern concepts of technology and of the arts, including literature, were purified and 
distinguished precisely through the exclusion of rhetoric as a form of knowledge which had hitherto 
been common to both. 
 
In “Building Dwelling Thinking”, Heidegger (2011) traces “techne” back to its Greek root tikto, 
which means (as he says) “to bring forth or to produce” but also (as he does not say) “to give birth”, 
so that tikto combines that sense of intentional mediation which techne inherits from it with the kind 
of self-developing generation usually associated with its contrasting term (though not exactly its 
opposite), physis. “The Greeks”, Heidegger continues, “conceive of techne, producing, in terms of 
letting appear. Techne thus conceived has been concealed in the tectonics of architecture since ancient 
times. Of late it still remains concealed, and more resolutely, in the technology of power machinery” 
(p. 253). To this Heideggerean delving, we can also add that the reconstructed proto-Indo-European 
root of techne is *teks-, which has to do with building or construction. *Teks- likewise lies behind the 
Latin verb texere, weaving, which gives rise to our own metaphor of the literary text.  
 
We could call this historical relationship between the concepts of technology and literature a 
technological dialectic, were it not that the modern associations of the term “technology” serve 
unhelpfully to obscure the very process I have been describing. We have probably come too far to 
entertain much hope of reinstalling “technology” as a name for a specific kind of discursive operation, 
but it might yet be possible to recuperate the emphasis, present in the earliest definitions of 
“technology” and lost in the intervening centuries, on writing as the form of mediation through which 
human reality and technical reality are most readily understood to be mutually articulative. To mark 
this ambition, we might recuperate another term from the rhetoricians, to remind us that a union of the 
material and the symbolic is ingrained within the concept of technology itself from the earliest times.   
 
Technography, like “technology”, was once a term for a systematic treatise, specifically a treatise on 
the art of rhetoric. The author of the Rhetoric to Alexander, for instance — long attributed to Aristotle 
but probably the work of Anaximenes of Lampsacus — speaks of borrowing certain well-expressed 
principles from the authors (τεχνογράφον) of such treatises. So too Philostratus the Athenian, who in 
the Lives of the Sophists uses the same word to describe Caninius Celer, rhetoric teacher to the young 
Marcus Aurelius. In the nineteenth century, “technography” was occasionally used to describe written 
economic, sociological, or historical accounts of specific processes or devices — in other words, 
“technography” began to designate the kind of writing that had previously been designated by 
“technology” — and, more recently, it has been revived in a variety of academic contexts. In 
sociology, “technography” has been used to denote “an ethnographic approach emphasizing the 
technological dimension of a culture” (Wengenroth, 2008, p. 831) or, more simply, “an ethnography 
of technology” (Jansen & Vellema, 2011, p. 169). For the anthropologist Paul Richards (2005), 
technography “describes technologies from the point of view of how they are actually used, and not 
from the perspective of how they are supposed to work” (p. 199). And the postmodern architectural 
theorist Marco Frascari (1990) has adopted the term to describe an ideal form of architectural drawing 
which serves not only to represent, but also to calculate and demonstrate, the multiple instrumental 
and symbolic relationships between an imagined structure and the realization of that structure in the 
world of physical objects. 
 
For Steven Connor (2016), technography is “a writing out of an operation that consists in that very 
writing”; in literary terms, this can be conceived as a way of thinking in and through written language, 
much as mathematical calculations can be conceived as a way of thinking in and through written 
numbers. Technography, he suggests, “is immanent, exploratory and procedural rather than 
declarative”, and in this sense literature might be understood to be technographic “in the sense that it 
is ever more taken up with the kind of machinery that it itself is” (p. 18). Where Connor is interested 
in the artifice of literary writing as a kind of reflexive technological project, Sean Pryor and David 
Trotter (2016) conceive of technography as a specific attentiveness to the historical and theoretical 
aspects of the relationship between writing and technology. To think in terms of technography is 
therefore to cultivate an attentiveness “to the rhetoric sedimented in machines, to machines behaving 
rhetorically, to rhetoric that behaves mechanically, and to rhetoric behaving in pointed opposition to 
mechanism” (p. 16).  
 
That “technography” already gives its imprimatur to inquiries that interest themselves in particular 
kinds of literary procedure and to ones that consider certain kinds of material mediation strikes me as 
a healthy sign: within the horizon of technography, our comparatively modern interest in the 
“literary” as a uniquely prized canon of writing might resolve into a new interest in questions of the 
relationship between technical procedures and rhetorical ones. “Technography” then would not aim to 
return us to thinking about primarily how media represent or how technologies are represented, nor 
would it revive the linguistic turn to think in poststructuralist terms about a world of limitless 
textuality. It would not lay claim to the systematization of an “ism”, or indeed of an “-ology”, but 
would rather seek a more radical conception of the symbiosis of the technical and the symbolic that is 
written into the concept of technology from the beginning. By giving a name to the dialectic of 
technological and textual production, technography reminds us of the textual origins of the technology 
concept, and of the constant work of mutual articulation performed by technology and writing 
throughout history. The oddity of the term may itself serve to encourage the investigation of how the 
textual and the technical combine within and reshape particular social contexts, and of how our ideas 
of what a text is, and what a technology is, are themselves constantly being revised.  
 
Technography makes a claim for the importance not of discourse as such, but of a specific kind of 
discourse that prioritizes an awareness of the process of its own mediation; a kind of writing which 
seeks to bring to consciousness the technicity of text and the textuality of technics; the kind of writing 
which we have recently been inclined to call literature, but which encompasses symbolic operations 
― techniques, or indeed technics ― across many media forms. Technography might, then, be best 
understood less as a method than as a resistance to settling at one or other end of the object-discourse 
axis established by the rise of aesthetics in the eighteenth century. Technography does not positivise 
terms like “literature” or “technology” or “media”, but seeks to understand how those concepts are 
transformed in the emergence of specific technical and discursive potentials. Equally, technography 
does not positivise the discursive operations involved in the transformation of those concepts, but tries 
to understand how particular discursive possibilities are themselves shaped by technical means. Such 
an exploration of the mutual mediation of technology and literature might, then, be punctuated not 
with intervening commas, but with dashes that better suggest their weaving together or wiring up. 
Literature―Technology―Media: as an approach to how texts and technical systems write each other 
into existence, technography does not presuppose where, if anywhere, text begins, and the machine 
stops. 
 
Literary works have never been simply purveyors of representational content, channels for messages 
or signals, or objects whose meanings can be made explicit either by traditional hermeneutics or by 
media analysis. This is not to suggest that works of literature always make a fetish of their own 
material media, but rather that literature is a name we have sometimes given to cases of writing which 
calibrate their formal processes with particular precision to the affordances and resistances of a 
specific environment of technological mediation. Such works not only reflect these environmental 
conditions, but perform their own supple and systematic theorizing about their own processes of 
technological mediation: formally (in the various specialized techniques of poetic, narrative, or 
dramatic composition), liminally (in paratextual forms of address), materially (by attuning themselves 
to the capacities of a particular medium such as the book, the recording, the performance, or the 
screen), and socially (in terms of the wider media environment of a given society). As they do so, they 
reconfigure the very concepts of technology and of literature. The new technological focus provided 
by disciplines like media archaeology and cultural techniques has helped us to remember that writing 
is technological, through and through. Yet it would be a mistake to let a focus on devices, systems, 
and techniques blind us to the fact that the converse is also true: technology is written, through and 
through. The task remains — for literary scholars, media archaeologists, and cultural technicians alike 
— to give due consideration to both parts of the technographic dialectic. 
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